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ABSTRACT 
Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach 
by Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper G. de Vries* 
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation 
environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by the court. 
The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the 
asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of 
their cases by hiring skillful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the 
equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The 
British rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases 
of our model. 
JEL Numbers: D8, K4 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG    
Vergleichende Analyse von Prozeßsystemen: Ein auktionstheoretischer Ansatz 
Anhand eines einfachen auktionstheoretischen Ansatzes werden symmetrische 
Prozeßumwelten untersucht, bei denen der Eigentümer des Streitgegenstandes dem 
Gericht nicht bekannt ist. Das Gericht kann nur die Qualität der durch die einzelnen 
Parteien präsentierten Argumente beobachten und dann jener Partei den 
Vermögenszuschlag geben, die die besten Argumente präsentiert hat. Rationale 
Prozeßparteien beeinflussen die Qualität ihrer Argumente  durch den Einsatz 
geschickter Anwälte. Der gewählte Ansatz erlaubt es, die im Gleichgewicht 
entstehenden Prozeßkosten für ein Kontinuum von Rechtssystemen zu vergleichen. Die 
britische Rechtsregelung, die amerikanische Rechtsregelung und einige jüngst 
vorgeschlagene Rechtsformen sind Spezialfälle des vorgestellten Modells. 
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1 Introduction
Why is the United States internationally scorned as the litigious society? Are judi-
cial reforms, such as those proposed by the Presidents Council on Competitiveness,
justiÞed or misguided? More generally, can one rank the legal expenditures induced
by legal systems such as the American, British, and Continental rules, and if so, do
systems that result in lower expenditures per trial necessarily reduce the social cost
of litigation? This paper uses an auction-theoretic framework to address these and
other questions.
Our paper is motivated in part by the growing policy debate over the need for
reform of the American justice system.1 For instance, as early as 1991 the Presidents
Council on Competitiveness (chaired at that time by Vice President Dan Qualye),
proposed to modify the American legal system (in which all litigants pay their own
legal expenditures) by requiring that the loser reimburse the winner for legal fees up
to the amount actually spent by the loser.2 The rationale for the proposed Quayle
system was that it would reduce legal expenditures and the number of cases brought
to court, since every dollar the loser paid its attorneys would ultimately result in two
dollars paid by the loser. Other legal systems (such as the British and Continental
1A number of recent papers provide important insights into the impact of reforms designed to
deter frivolous suits (Che and Earnhart, 1997; Bebchuk and Chang, 1996; Polinski and Rubinfeld,
1996, 1998) or aﬀect settlement incentives (Spier,1994; Gong and McAfee, 2000).
2This was proposed in the Councils Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America (1991).
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rules), also require losers to compensate winners for a portion of their legal costs.3
In modeling litigation, simplifying assumptions are typically made to facilitate
the analysis. One approach, common to the literature on pre-trial negotiation and
settlement, assumes that legal expenditures during a trial do not have any eﬀect on
the trials outcome. For instance, Spier (1992) assumes that it is costly for a plaintiﬀ
to go to court but that these costs do not inßuence the courts decision. In her model,
the plaintiﬀ always wins, but the amount won is a random variable from a distribution
f (v) with a strictly increasing hazard rate, f/ (1− F ). Schweizer (1989) considers
a model where both the plaintiﬀ and defendant might win, but the probability of
winning is exogenous and independent of the legal expenditures of the parties. While
these modeling assumptions are useful for understanding why parties in a dispute
have an incentive to settle out of court rather than going to trial, they do not permit
a comparative analysis of the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise in situations
where parties can improve their chances of winning a trial by hiring better attorneys
or experts.
Another approach, called the optimism model (cf. Hughes and Snyder, 1995),
assumes that each party has exogenous beliefs regarding the merits of their case.
These beliefs determine not only whether the parties settle, but the expected payoﬀ
3Under the British system, the loser pays its own legal costs and, in addition, reimburses the
winner for all of its costs. The Continental system requires the loser to pay its own legal costs, plus
a Þxed fraction of the winners legal fees.
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to each party from a trial. In particular, under the American rule the plaintiﬀs
expected payoﬀ from trial is pA−x, where p is her belief concerning the likelihood of
winning an amount A in trial, and x is the amount the plaintiﬀ must spend to litigate
the case. In contrast, under the British rule the plaintiﬀs expected payoﬀ is given by
pA− (1− p) (x+ y), where y is the amount the defendant must spend to defend the
litigation. Based on this model, Hughes and Snyder conclude that when p is greater
than 0.5 and litigation expenditures are symmetric (x = y), the British Rule leads to
a lower expected payoﬀ for the plaintiﬀ than the American rule. As a consequence,
plaintiﬀs will litigate fewer cases: For exogenously given legal expenditures per trial,
and exogenous subjective probabilities of winning a case, the British rule leads to
lower total legal outlays than the American system.
Our analysis diﬀers from this existing literature in several respects. First, we focus
on a symmetric trial environment rather than pre-trial negotiation and settlements.
In situations where the court and/or parties can readily observe the underlying merits
of the case, one would expect the parties to reach a settlement or otherwise the court
to issue summary judgement. In our model, cases brought to trial have the property
of being symmetric in the sense that the observable merits of each sides position are
roughly the same, at least initially.
Secondly, we assume that the parties in such a suit can inßuence the observ-
able merits of their case (and thus their probability of winning) by purchasing legal
services. Thus, unlike the existing literature which assumes either that there is an
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a priori correct verdict or that the probability of winning is independent of the
quality of legal services purchased by the litigants, we examine the equilibrium ex-
penditures that arise under various legal systems. Equilibrium requires, among other
things, that expenditures on legal services be based on rational beliefs regarding the
probability of winning: Subjective beliefs are correct in equilibrium.
As we will see, these modeling diﬀerences enable us to use auction-theoretic tools
to examine how rational litigants respond to the incentives created by various fee-
shifting rules.4 In addition, we are able to examine the impact of asymmetric infor-
mation (among the parties and the court) on equilibrium litigation expenditures and
outcomes under a continuum of legal settings, including the Quayle system. This is
in contrast to existing work that provides pairwise comparisons of the American and
British rules (cf. Shavell (1982), Braeutigam, Owen, and Panzar (1984)), or models
such as those by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and Hause (1989) which are based on
diﬀerent informational and/or rationality assumptions.
Our simple model also sheds light on two competing views of the justice system.
One view  held by many Americans  is that winners and losers in court cases are
determined by how much the parties spend on high-priced attorneys  not on the
intrinsic merits of the case. At the other extreme is the view that justice is always
served  how much you pay an attorney is irrelevant; all that matters is the quality of
4As noted by Klemperer (2000), auction theory is a powerful tool for analyzing a host of economic
problems, including litigation.
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the case presented at trial. We show that these two views need not be inconsistent.
More speciÞcally, we examine symmetric trial environments where (1) legal ex-
penditures increase the quality of the case presented; (2) justice is always served, and
(3) litigation costs are neither subsidized nor taxed in the aggregate. Here, symmet-
ric means that the initial endowments of evidence make the case equally meritorious
in the eyes of the law, and furthermore, each party has access to equally qualiÞed
attorneys to present their side of the case to the court. To be concrete, consider a
divorced couple engaged in a nasty custody battle over a child. When the initial
endowments are symmetric (for instance, both parents work and are on good terms
with the child), there is no a priori basis for determining the correct or incorrect
decision. All the court can do is evaluate the arguments presented by each side, and
award custody to the party presenting the best case. Thus, the assumption that jus-
tice is always served does not mean that absolute truth is realized, but rather that
the court awards custody to the most deserving party, given the evidence presented
at trial.
Section 2 presents a parameterized litigation model that subsumes the American,
British, and Continental systems as special cases. Novel systems like the Quayle sys-
tem, the Matthew system (where the winner pays the loser an amount that is propor-
tional the winners legal expenditures), and the Marshall System (where the winner
graciously picks up the losers legal bill), all obtain as special cases. Our Proposition
1 shows that, in any litigation environment where justice is always served, players
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have symmetric access to quality legal representation, and where legal expenditures
increase the quality of the case presented to the court, then the player spending the
most on attorneys always wins. Thus, just outcomes are not inconsistent with the
observation that the winning party spent the most on attorneys.
Section 3 uses auction-theoretic tools to characterize the equilibrium legal ex-
penditures that arise for the parameterized class of legal systems, while Section 4
oﬀers several Propositions which may be used to compare the expenditures that arise
under alternative fee-shifting rules. We also identify a legal system that results in
minimal legal expenditures per trial while guaranteeing that the judicial outcome is
both just and eﬃcient. We Þnd that, in equilibrium, the American system results
in lower expected legal costs per trial than either the Continental or British system,
and furthermore, that the Quayle system leads to precisely the same expected legal
expenditures as the American system. However, the incentive to go to trial is ac-
tually higher under the American system than the Continental or British System.
A testable implication is that there are more trials in the U.S. than in Britain or
on the Continent, but that less is spent on a per-trial basis in the United States.
Litigation incentives under the Quayle and American systems are identical, so we
may conclude that the Councils proposal does not represent an improvement over
the status quo. More generally we Þnd that there is a trade-oﬀ between the expected
legal expenditures per trial and the number of trials: Legal systems that result in
lower expenditures per trial result in a greater number of trials.
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2 A Model of Litigation
Two parties are unable to settle a dispute regarding the ownership of an indivisible
asset. Each party i values the asset at vi, and these valuations are independent
random draws from a continuous density f with distribution function F .5 Each
partys valuation is private information, unobserved by the other party and the court.
The distribution of valuations is assumed to be common knowledge.
The legal ownership of the asset in dispute is unknown. The role of the court is to
examine the evidence presented at trial and, based on the evidence, award the asset
to one of the parties. It is costly for the parties to gather evidence and present their
case. We assume that the quality of the case presented by a party (qi) is a function
of her expenditures on legal services. The court observes only the quality of the case
presented by each party (q1 and q2).
The litigation environment requires the two parties to simultaneously commit
to legal expenditures, ei ≥ 0. Of course, diﬀerent litigation systems have diﬀerent
implications for ultimate payoﬀs of the parties. For instance, the American system
requires the winner and loser to pay their own legal expenditures, while the British
system requires the loser to reimburse the winner for her legal expenditures. To
capture the eﬀects of diﬀerent legal environments, assume that the payoﬀ to party i
depends on whether she wins or loses the trial as well as the fee-shifting rules implied
5The analysis can be extended to the case of correlated values and/or the case where litigants
receive aﬃliated signals of values; see Baye et al. (1998).
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by the justice system:
ui(ei, ej , vi) =

vi − βei − δej if party i wins
−αei − θej if party i loses
(1)
Here, (β,α, δ, θ) are fee-shifting parameters that summarize the amount of legal ex-
penditures borne by each party in the event of a favorable or unfavorable judgement.
We assume that (β,α) ≥ 0, with strict inequality for at least one element. This
implies that, given the judicial decision, a partys utility is non-increasing in her legal
expenditures. In contrast, the parameters (δ, θ) may be positive or negative, depend-
ing upon whether the winner and loser pay or receive a transfer based on the other
partys legal expenditures. This formulation permits us to examine a variety of legal
environments. For instance, when β = α = 1 and δ = θ = 0, the model captures
the American system where each party pays her own legal expenses regardless of the
outcome. The case where α = θ = 1 and β = δ = 0 corresponds to the British
system, where the loser pays its own legal costs as well as those of the winner.
To complete the model, we assume that the courts decision is inßuenced by the
quality of the case presented by each party. The quality of party is case, in turn,
is a continuous, strictly increasing function of her legal expenditures. We focus on
environments where parties are endowed with symmetric technologies for producing
a favorable case. In other words, neither party has a distinct advantage with respect
to the evidentiary or legal merits of her claims to the disputed asset, nor access to an
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attorney capable of making superior legal argument on her behalf. Obviously, in some
legal environments one party may have a stronger claim to the asset than the other
party. Cases such as these are typically settled out of court or otherwise dismissed on
summary judgement by the court.6 Regardless, our focus on situations where both
parties are on equal footing permits us to compare expenditures in a meaningful way
across diﬀerent fee allocation mechanisms.
More formally, let qi denote the quality of party is case and φ denote the pro-
duction function that maps each players legal expenditures into that players case
quality. We assume
(A1) Monotonic Legal Production Function The quality of the case presented
by player i is given by qi = φ (ei) , where φ is a continuous and strictly increasing
function of player is expenditures on legal services.
Notice that we are taking an agnostic position with respect to any notion of the
truth underlying the case. Our motivation for this is two-fold. First, in many
disputes regarding ownership, each side believes that they have a legal right to the
item in dispute. Each side presents arguments supporting a decision in their favor, and
the courts role is to weigh the case presented by the parties and render its decision.
Second, since our objective is to compare the amount spent for legal services under
6Waldfogel (1998) presents evidence which suggests that the pretrial adjudication process tends
to weed out parties with observable asymmetries, so that parties actually going to trial (and trial
outcomes) tend to be symmetric.
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various fee-shifting rules, it is important to restrict attention to environments where
legal expenditures do not distort the truth. While situations do arise where a party
expends hefty legal expenditures to wrongfully win a case, a comparative analysis
of fee-shifting rules in such environments would be misguided. In particular, if one
fee-shifting system resulted in lower expenditures than another system but resulted
in more incorrect judicial decisions, the relative merits of the two systems would
depend on the social trade-oﬀ (if any) between justice and legal costs.
Since we are assuming that the true ownership of the item in dispute is unknown,
justice reduces to the situation where the court weighs the evidence presented and
awards the asset to the party with the most meritorious case.
(A2) Justice is Always Served If party i presents the best case (qi > qj) , party
i wins with probability one. If the two parties cases are of identical quality
(qi = qj), each party wins with probability 1/2.
This assumption rules out judicial mistakes and jury nulliÞcation whereby the court
rules in favor of the party presenting the weakest case.
Finally, we focus on environments where the two litigants legal expenditures
are neither subsidized nor taxed by an outside party. Thus, while the loser and/or
winner might be required to reimburse the other party for some portion of her legal
expenditures, the sum of the expenditures of the two litigants exactly equals the
aggregate amount spent on legal services. We formalize this assumption as
11
(A3) Internalized Legal Costs There are no subsidies or taxes; all legal expenses
are borne by the litigants.
We are now in a position to characterize the players payoﬀ functions.
Proposition 1 Suppose assumptions A1 through A3 hold. Then the payoﬀ functions
for the two parties are given by
ui(ei, ej , vi) =

vi − βei − (1− α) ej if ei > ej
vi/2− ei if ei = ej
−αei − (1− β) ej if ej > ei
(2)
Proof: Note that assumption A3 implies that α+ δ = β + θ = 1, so δ = (1− α)
and θ = (1− β). By A2, party i wins if qi > qj, loses if qj > qi, and wins with
probability 1/2 if qi = qj. Substituting these relations into equation (1) yields
ui(ei, ej, vi) =

vi − βei − (1− α) ej if qi > qj
vi/2− ei if qi = qj
−αei − (1− β) ej if qj > qi
But by A1, qi = φ (ei) and φ is monotonic. This implies that qi ≥ qj if and only if
ei ≥ ej , which yields the form of payoﬀs in equation (2). QED
Several aspects of Proposition 1 are worth noting. First, in symmetric environ-
ments where legal expenditures enhance the quality of the case presented to the court
and justice is always served, the party spending the most on legal services always wins.
Outcomes where parties appear to buy justice by hiring superior (and more costly)
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attorneys are, in fact, consistent with justice being served; indeed, these legal envi-
ronments imply such outcomes. The contrapositive of Proposition 1 implies that, if
the party spending the most does not win, then there were either judicial mistakes or
the parties were endowed with diﬀerent technologies for making their case. The latter
might occur due to diﬀerences in access to quality legal counsel or diﬀerent initial
endowments of evidence. While our focus on symmetric legal environments where
justice is always served is not without loss of generality, it is the natural benchmark
to use in comparing the relative merits of diﬀerent fee-shifting rules.
Second, the form of payoﬀ functions in Proposition 1 permits us to vary the fee-
shifting parameters to capture a variety of diﬀerent litigation rules as special cases.
For instance, the following litigation rules are included as important special cases:
American System ( α = β = 1): Each party pays their own legal expenses, and
the party presenting the highest quality case wins. In this case, the payoﬀ functions
in equation (2) simplify to
ui(ei, ej, vi) =

vi − ei if ei > ej
vi/2− ei if ei = ej
−ei if ej > ei
British System (α = 1; β = 0): The party presenting the best case wins, and
the loser pays her own legal expenses as well as those of the winning party. With this
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parameterization, the payoﬀ functions in equation (2) are:
ui (ei, ej, vi) =

vi if ei > ej
vi/2− ei if ei = ej
−ei − ej if ej > ei
Continental System (α = 1; β ∈ (0, 1)). The loser pays his own costs and, in
addition, pays a fraction (1− β) of the winners expenses:
ui (ei, ej , vi) =

vi − βei if ei > ej
vi/2− ei if ei = ej
−ei − (1− β) ej if ej > ei
In addition to these well-known systems, our parameterization permits us to ex-
amine more exotic systems, such as ones we call the Quayle, Marshall, and Matthew
systems:
Quayle System7 (α = 2; β = 1): The loser pays his own costs and reimburses
the winner up to the level of the losers own costs:
ui(ei, ej, vi) =

vi − ei + ej if ei > ej
vi/2− ei if ei = ej
−2ei if ej > ei
7As noted in introduction, we call this parameterization the Quayle system because Dan Quayle
chaired the Presidents Council on Competitiveness, which recommended that the U.S. adopt this
mechanism in its Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America (1991). Smith (1992) analyzed this
system in a model where parties subjective probabilities of winning may not be consistent, and in
which the determination of legal expenditures is exogenous.
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Marshall System8 (α = 0; β = 1): The Marshall system is the reverse of the
British system: the winner pays her own costs and, in addition, reimburses the loser
for all of its legal costs:
ui(ei, ej, vi) =

vi − ei − ej if ei > ej
vi/2− ei if ei = ej
0 if ej > ei
Matthew System9 (α = 1; β ∈ (1,∞)): The winner is required to go the extra
mile and transfer an amount to the loser that is proportional to the winners legal
expenditures. This is, in a sense, the reverse of the Quayle system which requires the
loser to transfer an amount to the winner. The payoﬀs for the Matthew system are
similar to the Continental rule, except β > 1:
8We call this the Marshall System in honor of George Catlett Marshall who, as U.S. Secretary of
State, organized the European Recovery Program (better known as the Marshall Plan). He is not to
be confused with Thurgood Marshall or John Marshall, both of whom served on the U.S. Supreme
Court.
9We call this the Matthew system because Matthew 5: 39-41 states:
But I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy
right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and
take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to
go a mile, go with him twain.
Loosely translated: If you are forced to spend $1 defending yourself in court, go the extra mile
and pay an additional amount to your adversary.
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ui(ei, ej, vi) =

vi − βei if ei > ej
vi/2− ei if ei = ej
−ei − (1− β) ej if ej > ei
The auction-like structure of the these payoﬀs, and more generally the payoﬀs in
equation (2), permits us to use auction-theoretic tools to analyze this parameterized
class of legal systems. For the remainder of the analysis, we also assume:
(A4) Regularity Conditions on the Distribution of Valuations The density of
valuations is continuous and strictly positive on its support, [0, v], where 0 <
v <∞.
3 Equilibrium Outlays for Legal Services
Let ei (vi) denote the legal expenditures of a party who values the item in dispute at
vi. It is natural to assume that legal expenditures are a strictly increasing function of
the amount a litigant stands to gain by winning: e0i(vi) > 0. Under this assumption,
e−1i exists, and the expected payoﬀ EU(ei, vi) of a party who expends ei on legal
services is:
EU(ei, vi) =
Z e−1j (ei)
0
[vi − βei − (1− α)ej(vj)]f(vj)dvj
+
Z v
e−1j (ei)
[−αei − (1− β)ej(vj)]f(vj)dvj . (3)
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Diﬀerentiating with respect to ei gives the Þrst order condition for player is optimal
level of legal expenditures:
1
e0j(e
−1
j (ei))
h
vi − βei − (1− α)ej(e−1j (ei))
i
f(e−1j (ei))−
Z e−1j (ei)
0
βf(vj)dvj
− 1
e0j(e
−1
j (ei))
[−αei − (1− β)ei]f(e−1j (ei))−
Z v
e−1j (ei)
αf(vj)dvj = 0.
In a symmetric equilibrium, ei (v) = ej(v) = e (v) , so we may simplify the last
expression to obtain the diﬀerential equation:
e0(v) =
vf(v)
α− (α− β)F (v) +
2(α− β)f(v)
α− (α− β)F (v)e(v).
The solution to this diﬀerential equation is given by
e(v) =
Z v
0
sf(s)
α− (α− β)F (s) exp
"Z v
s
2(α− β)f(u)
α− (α− β)F (u)du
#
ds.
Straightforward manipulation (and noting Lemma 1 in the Appendix) yields
Proposition 2 Suppose the litigation environment satisÞes (A1) through (A4). Then
in a symmetric equilibrium, the legal expenditures of a party who values the item in
dispute at v is
e(v) = [α− (α− β)F (v)]−2
Z v
0
sf(s)[α− (α− β)F (s)]ds. (4)
Notice that under assumptions A1 though A4, the item in dispute is always
awarded to the party presenting the best case (justice is always served), and fur-
thermore, the allocation of the item is eﬃcient since it is always awarded to the
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party valuing it most highly (this follows from the symmetry and monotonicity of the
equilibrium expenditures in equation (4); see Lemma 1).
Table 1 shows how Proposition 2 can be used to obtain closed form expressions
for the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under various legal systems. In
each case, the resulting expenditures are obtained simply by substituting speciÞc
parameter values for (α,β) into the general expression in Proposition 2.
Table 1: Equilibrium Legal Expenditures
for Selected Legal Systems
Legal System α, β Expenditures (e (v))
American α = 1, β = 1
R v
0 sf(s)ds
British α = 1, β = 0
R v
0
sf(s)[1−F (s)]ds
[1−F (v)]2
Continental α = 1, β ∈ (0, 1)
R v
0
sf(s)[1−(1−β)F (s)]ds
(1−(1−β)F (v))2
Marshall α = 0, β = 1
R v
0
sf(s)F (s)ds
F (v)2
Quayle α = 2, β = 1
R v
0
sf(s)[2−F (s)]ds
[2−F (v)]2
Matthew α = 1, β ∈ (1,∞)
R v
0
sf(s)[1−(1−β)F (s)]ds
(1−(1−β)F (v))2
4 The Cost of Litigation per Trial
In order to compare the equilibrium levels of legal expenditures that arise under
diﬀerent legal systems, we Þrst establish
Proposition 3 Under assumptions A1 through A4, the equilibrium expenditures of
a litigant who values the item at v ∈ (0, v) are strictly decreasing in β.
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Proof:
Inspection of the equilibrium expenditure function in equation (4) reveals that it
is suﬃcient to show that
(α− (α− β)F (s))
(α− (α− β)F (v))2
is strictly decreasing in β for 0 < s < v < v. Since and (α, β) ≥ 0 with at least one
strictly positive element:
d
dβ
Ã
(α− (α− β)F (s))
(α− (α− β)F (v))2
!
=
F (s)α+ αF (s)F (v)− βF (s)F (v)− 2αF (v)
(α (1− F (v)) + βF (v))3
≤ F (v)α+ αF (v)F (v)− βF (s)F (v)− 2αF (v)
(α (1− F (v)) + βF (v))3
=
−αF (v) (1− F (v))− βF (s)F (v)
(α (1− F (v)) + βF (v))3
< 0
for 0 < s < v < v. QED
Thus, other things equal, litigants spend less on legal services in legal systems
where β is higher. This result stems from two eﬀects of an increase in β. First, legal
systems with higher βs require the winner to pay a greater share of her own legal
expenditures. This reduces the beneÞts of winning, and therefore induces parties to
spend less on attorneys. Second, an increase in β increases the payoﬀ to the loser by
reducing the amount of the winners expenses the loser is required to pay. In fact,
when β increases above unity, the loser actually receives a direct payment from the
winner. In short, an increase in β reduces the beneÞt of winning relative to losing,
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and this leads to less vigorous legal battles in court.
Proposition 3 permits us to compare the expenditures arising under several of
the litigation systems in Table 1. To see this, note that the only diﬀerences in the
American, British, Continental, and Matthew systems is β, as α = 1 for all of these
systems. Since β is highest under the Matthew system and lowest under the British
system, it follows that, regardless of her valuation, a litigant will spend more under
the British system than under the Continental, American, or Matthew systems. To
summarize, the following result follows directly from Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 Under assumptions A1 through A4, the equilibrium expenditures of
a litigant who values the item at v ∈ (0, v) can be ordered as follows:
e (v)British > e (v)Continental > e (v)American > e (v)Matthew
Unfortunately, Proposition 4 does not provide a complete ranking of all of the
legal systems in Table 1. This stems from the fact that the equilibrium expenditure
functions under the American system and the Quayle system cross, as do expenditures
under the American system and Marshall system. In situations where the expenditure
functions cross, unambiguous expenditure rankings are not possible. To see this,
consider the special case where the distribution of values is uniformly distributed on
the unit interval (F (v) = v for v ∈ [0, 1]). In this case, equilibrium expenditures
under the American and Marshall systems are given by
eA (v) =
1
2
v2
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and
eM (v) =
1
3
v,
respectively. These functions cross at v = 2
3
: Litigants with valuations below 2
3
spend
less under the American system, while those with valuations above 2
3
spend more
under the American system.
More generally, let L (ε) = {v|v ∈ (0, ε]} and H (ε) = {v|v ∈ [v − ε, v]} denote
neighborhoods of the lowest and highest possible valuations of the item in dispute.
Proposition 5 If assumptions A1 through A4 hold and ε > 0 is suﬃciently small:
(a) For v ∈ L (ε) :
e (v)Quayle < e (v)American < e (v)Marshall
(b) For v ∈ H (ε) :
e (v)Quayle > e (v)American > e (v)Marshall
Proof:
Part (a). We establish the Þrst inequality as follows. Choose ε ∈
³
0, F−1
³
2−√2
´´
.
Comparison of e (v)Quayle and e (v)American in Table 1 reveals that it is suﬃcient to
show that for all v ∈ (0, ε] and s ∈ (0, v):
2− F (s)
(2− F (v))2 < 1.
But this is easily satisÞed, since
(2− F (v))2 ≥ (2− F (ε))2 >
³
2− F
³
F−1
³
2−
√
2
´´´2
= 2.
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To establish the second inequality, note that, by Lemma 2 in the Appendix, the
expenditures of a litigant who values the item at v = 0 is zero under both the
American and Marshall systems. Since e (v) is continuous in v, it is suﬃcient to show
that at v = 0, the slope of the expenditure function under the American system is
less than that under the Marshall system. Lemma 3 shows that this is indeed the
case, thus completing the proof of part (a). Part (b). Both inequalities for this part
of the Proposition follow from the continuity of e (v) and Lemma 4. QED
Proposition 5 reveals that the American, Quayle, and Marshall systems have quite
diﬀerent implications for diﬀerent types of litigants. Litigants who do not value the
disputed item very highly will tend to spend less under the Quayle system than under
the American system. In contrast, litigants who value the item highly spend more
under the Quayle system than under the American system. These results stem from
diﬀerences in payments by winners and losers under the two systems. Since the legal
expenditures of party j (and thus the quality party js case) are increasing in vj,
both systems imply that a party with a low valuation is unlikely to win. Under the
Quayle system, losers pay not only their own attorney fees, but also must reimburse
the winner up to the losers legal expenditures. Relative to the American system
(where losers only pay their own legal fees), the Quayle system thus provides litigants
with low valuations an incentive to spend less on attorneys, and litigants with high
valuations an incentive to spend more.
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Why didnt the U.S. adopt the Quayle system? One possibility is that the median
voter valued items in dispute quite highly, and realized that her expected legal costs
would rise in moving from the American system to the Quayle system. A more
compelling reason for its failure is that, on average, the Quayle system does not lead
to an improvement over the current U.S. system. As we will see below, even though
some types prefer the Quayle system to the American System and others prefer the
American system to the Quayle system, these eﬀects average out across all types.
More generally, if we compare the expected total expenditures that arise under each
system in Table 1, a complete ranking of expenditures is possible and furthermore,
the American, Quayle, and Marshall systems generate identical total expected legal
expenditures.
To see this, let TC denote the total expected legal expenditures that arise in a
symmetric equilibrium:
TC ≡ E[e1(v1) + e2(v2)] = 2E[e(v)].
These expenditures generally vary depending on the fee-shifting parameters of the
legal system. Legal systems that result in lower expected legal expenditures are most
desirable from the viewpoint of the litigants; from the viewpoint of attorneys, legal
systems that result in the highest expected legal expenditures are most desirable.
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Proposition 6 Under assumptions A1 through A4, total expected legal expenditures
can be ordered as follows:
TCBritish > TCContinental > TCAmerican = TCMarshall = TCQuayle > TCMatthew
Proof:
Since the rankings in Proposition 4 hold for all v, they also hold in expectation.
Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that TCAmerican = TCMarshall = TCQuayle. Under as-
sumptions A1 through A4, e (v) is symmetric and (by Lemma 1) strictly increasing.
This means that for all (α, β) ≥ 0, the courts allocation of the item in dispute is
eﬃcient in the sense that the winning party values the item most highly. By the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem (see Myerson, 1981), this implies that the expected
total legal expenditures under a given legal system depends solely on the expected
payoﬀ earned by a litigant with the lowest possible valuation.10 Using equation (3),
the payoﬀ of a litigant who values the item at vi is
EU(vi) =
Z vi
0
[vi − βej(vi)− (1− α)ej(vj)]f(vj)dvj +Z v
vi
[−αej(vi)− (1− β)ej(vj)]f(vj)dvj,
so the equilibrium payoﬀ of the party with the lowest possible valuation is
EU(0) = −αe(0)−
Z v
0
(1− β)e(s)f(s)ds.
10We are indebted to Paul Klemperer for suggesting this proof.
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Under the American, Marshall and Quayle systems, β = 1; thus for these legal
systems,
EU(0) = −αe(0).
Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that the expenditures of a litigant who values the disputed
item at v = 0 are equal under the American, Marshall, and Quayle systems. Since
Lemma 2 shows that the lowest valuation type spends zero in equilibrium under
all three systems, we conclude that TCAmerican = TCMarshall = TCQuayle. This
establishes the result. QED
While Proposition 6 provides a complete ranking of the total expected legal ex-
penditures that arise for the litigation rules in Table 1, a natural question is whether
one can rank the expected expenditures induced by legal systems with arbitrary fee-
shifting parameters, (α, β). To address this issue, we Þrst show that a litigants
expected legal expenditures are independent of α.
Proposition 7 Under assumptions A1 through A4, a litigants expected equilibrium
legal expenditures are given by
E [e (v)] =
1
β
Z v
0
vf(v)[1− F (v)]dv.
Proof.
From Proposition 2 we have
e(v) = [α− (α− β)F (v)]−2H(v),
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where
H(v) ≡
Z v
0
sf(s)[α− (α− β)F (s)]ds.
The expected legal expenditures can therefore be written as:
E[e(v)] =
Z v
0
e(v)f(v)dv
=
Z v
0
[α− (α− β)F (v)]−2H(v)f(v)dv.
Integration by parts gives
E[e(v)] = (α− β)−1[α− (α− β)F (v)]−1H(v)|v0
−
Z v
0
(α− β)−1[α− (α− β)F (v)]−1∂H(v)
∂v
dv
=
1
β(α− β)H(v)−
1
(α− β)
Z v
0
vf(v)dv,
since H(0) = 0 and
∂H(v)
∂v
= vf(v)[α− (α− β)F (v)].
Simplifying further gives
E[e(v)] =
1
β(α− β)
Z v
0
vf(v)[α− (α− β)F (v)]dv − E[v]
(α− β) .
= (
α
β(α− β) −
1
(α− β))E[v]−
1
β
Z v
0
vf(v)F (v)dv
=
1
β
E[v]− 1
β
Z v
0
vf(v)F (v)dv
=
1
β
Z v
0
vf(v)[1− F (v)]dv.
QED.
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Thus, although a litigants actual legal expenditures generally depend on both α
and β, her expected legal expenditures are independent of α. The intuition for this
result is as follows. In a symmetric equilibrium, all litigants adjust their expenditures
to account for their likelihood of winning: litigants with high valuations spend more
and litigants with lower valuations spend less. Regardless of the value of α, a litigant
with the lowest possible valuation knows he will lose for sure, and thus in equilibrium
spends nothing on legal services. In light of the payoﬀ structure in equation 2, this
means that when the loser has the lowest possible valuation, neither the winner nor
losers payoﬀ depends on α. Since equilibrium expected payoﬀs are determined by
the expected payoﬀ of the lowest valuation type and legal expenses are internalized,
expected equilibrium expenditures are independent of α.
Since total expected legal expenditures are given by TC = 2E [e (v)], Proposition
7 implies that total expected legal expenditures are not only independent of α, but
are strictly decreasing in β. To summarize,
Proposition 8 Under assumptions A1 through A4, total expected legal expenditures
are given by
TC (β) =
2
β
Z v
0
vf(v)[1− F (v)]dv.
Thus, regardless of the value of α, legal systems with higher βs result in unambigu-
ously lower total expected legal expenditures.
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5 Expected Payoﬀs and the Incentive to Litigate
Proposition 6 reveals that expected legal expenses are highest under the British sys-
tem and lowest under the Matthew system. In fact, Proposition 8 implies that by
choosing β arbitrarily large in the Matthew system, one can make total expected
legal expenditures arbitrarily small. Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that
the Matthew system is the optimal litigation system; after all, the judicial outcome
is both eﬃcient and just, and furthermore, the system can be devised in a manner
that minimizes legal expenditures on a per-trial basis. This reasoning is ßawed,
however, as the following analysis reveals.
By assumption A3, litigation costs are internalized, so total expected legal ex-
penditures equal the total expected utility loss from litigation. Thus, the expected
payoﬀs (denoted EU) of litigants are higher in systems where expected expenditures
are lower. It follows from Proposition 8 that
Proposition 9 Under assumptions A1 through A4, the expected payoﬀs of litigants
can be ordered as follows:
EUBritish < EUContinental < EUAmerican = EUMarshall = EUQuayle < EUMatthew
More generally, the expected payoﬀs of the litigants are independent of α and strictly
increasing in β.
Together, Propositions 8 and 9 illustrate an important trade-oﬀ. On the one hand,
legal systems with higher βs result in lower expected equilibrium legal expenditures
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per trial, and the Matthew system results in the lowest possible expected expenditures
per trial. On the other hand, legal systems with higher βs result in higher expected
payoﬀs from litigation, thus making it more attractive for parties to bring suits in
the Þrst place. Thus, while the Matthew system results in lower expenditures per
trial, adopting such a system would maximize the number of cases brought to trial.
Factoring in the increased number of trials, it is not at all clear that a movement to
the Matthew system would result in lower social outlays on legal services.
Regardless, the above results do suggest that a movement from the American to
the Continental or British systems would reduce the incentives of parties to litigate,
while a movement from the American to the Quayle system would have no impact
on litigation incentives. Testable implications of Propositions 6 and 9 include the
hypotheses that more cases are brought to trial under the American system than
under the British or Continental systems, and that less is spent per trial under the
American system. We note that Hughes and Snyder (1995) provide empirical evidence
that the American system indeed results in fewer trials than the British system. We
are unaware of any empirical evidence regarding per-trial expenditures under diﬀerent
legal systems.
To summarize, the eﬀective costs to society of a given legal system depend not
only on the expected expenditures per trial under each system, but the number of
trials induced by each system. Ceteris paribus, systems that generate lower expected
expenditures per trial provide greater expected payoﬀs from litigation, and therefore
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result in more cases being brought to trial.
6 Conclusion
Our auction-theoretic framework considered a symmetric litigation environment in
which the legal ownership of the disputed asset is unknown by the court. The court
observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to
the party presenting the best case (justice is always served). Litigants can inßuence
the quality of their case by hiring skillful attorneys. Even though the parties and the
court are asymmetrically informed, in equilibrium the courts decision is always just
and eﬃcient. The class of litigation systems considered includes standard systems
(such as the American, British, and Continental systems), as well as more exotic
ones (which we call the Quayle, Marshall, and Matthew systems).
Our framework provides a complete ranking of a continuum of diﬀerent legal
systems. Equilibrium legal expenditures per trial are increasing in the proportion of
the winners attorney fees that must be paid by the loser, while the expected payoﬀs
of the litigants are a decreasing function of this proportion. This results in a trade-
oﬀ: litigation systems with lower equilibrium legal expenditures per trial (such as
the American, Quayle, and Matthew systems) provide a greater incentive for parties
to sue than systems that entail higher equilibrium legal expenditures (such as the
British and Continental systems). Expected legal expenditures per trial, as well as
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litigation incentives, are independent of the proportion of the losers legal fees paid
by the winner and loser.
Our analysis also reveals that a movement from the American system to the
Quayle system would neither reduce expected legal expenditures on a per-trial basis
nor reduce the incentives for parties to litigate. To the extent that Americas reputa-
tion for being a litigious society is based on the shear number of suits brought to trial
in the U.S., a movement toward the Continental or British system might improve
matters by reducing the number of suits and the strain on the court system. Unfor-
tunately, such a move would result in higher expected legal costs on a per-trial basis.
While our analysis ignores the impact of budget constraints, one undesirable feature
of such a move might be to make courts a playing Þeld for only the wealthy. The
simple auction-theoretic litigation framework set forth in this paper, coupled with
recent work by Che and Gale (1998) on auctions with budget-constrained players,
may serve as a useful starting point for a more complete analysis of these issues.
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A Appendix
The heuristic argument used to derive the expression in equation (4) assumes that
ej (vi) > 0 and e
0
j(vi) > 0 for vi ∈ (0, v) . The following Lemma shows that these
conditions are satisÞed by the expression in equation (4).
Lemma 1 e (v) in equation (4) satisÞes the following properties for all v ∈ (0, v):
(a) e (v) > 0;
(b) e0(v) > 0.
Proof.
(a) This part follows from the fact that α(1 − F (s)) + βF (s) > 0 for v ∈ (0, v),
and (α, β) ≥ 0 with at least one element strictly positive. (b) To see that e0(v) > 0,
diﬀerentiate (4) to obtain
de(v)
dv
=
f(v)
([α− (α− β)F (v)])3Q(v),
where
Q(v) = 2(α− β)
Z v
0
sf(s)[α(1− F (s)) + βF (s)]ds
+v[α(1− F (v)) + βF (v)]2.
Evidently, for α ≥ β, Q(v) > 0 and hence e0(v) > 0. When α = 0, Q(v) can be
simpliÞed to
Q(v) = −2β
Z v
0
sf(s)βF (s)ds+ vβ2F (v)2
= β2
Z v
0
F (s)2ds > 0.
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Thus if α = 0 and β > 0 then e0(v) > 0. For the case 0 < α < β, we note that the
factors with 2αβ can be rewritten as
Z v
0
sf(s)F (s)ds−
Z v
0
sf(s)(1− F (s))ds+ v(1− F (v))F (v)
=
Z v
0
F (s)(1− F (s))ds > 0.
Let eA (v), eM (v), and eQ (v) denote the equilibrium expenditures arising under
the American, Marshall, and Quayle systems.
Lemma 2 Under assumptions A1 through A4,
lim
v→0 e
A (v) = lim
v→0 e
Q (v) = lim
v→0 e
M (v) = 0.
Proof. The Þrst two equalities follow directly, since
lim
v→0 e
A (v) = lim
v→0
Z v
0
sf(s)ds = 0
and
lim
v→0 e
Q (v) = lim
v→0
R v
0 sf(s)[2− F (s)]ds
(2− F (v))2 = 0.
For the last equality, use LHospitals rule to obtain
lim
v→0 e
M (v) = lim
v→0
R v
0 sf(s)F (s)ds
F (v)2
= lim
v→0
vf(v)F (v)
2F (v)f (v)
= 0.
Lemma 3 Under assumptions A1 through A4,
lim
v→0
deM (v)
dv
> lim
v→0
deA (v)
dv
= 0
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Proof. Note that
deM (v)
dv
= f (v)
"
F (v)2 v − 2 R v0 sf(s)F (s)ds
F (v)3
#
and
deA (v)
dv
= vf(v).
Clearly,
lim
v→0
deA (v)
dv
= 0.
Using LHospitals Rule,
lim
v→0
deM (v)
dv
= lim
v→0 f (v) limv→0
"
2vf (v)F (v) + F (v)2 − 2vf(v)F (v)
3F (v)2 f (v)
#
= f (0) lim
v→0
"
1
3f (v)
#
=
1
3
> 0,
and the result follows.
Lemma 4 Under assumptions A1 through A4,
lim
v→v
eQ (v) > lim
v→v
eA (v) > lim
v→v
eM (v) > 0
Proof. The last inequality follows from the fact that
eM (v) ≡ lim
v→v
eM (v)
= lim
v→v
R v
0 sf(s)F (s)ds
F (v)2
=
Z v
0
sf(s)F (s)ds > 0.
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To establish the middle inequality, note that
eA (v) ≡ lim
v→v
eA (v)
= lim
v→v
Z v
0
sf(s)ds
=
Z v
0
sf(s)ds
> eM (v) .
Finally, we establish the Þrst inequality:
eQ (v) ≡ lim
v→v
eQ (v)
= lim
v→v
R v
0 sf(s)[2− F (s)]ds
(2− F (v))2
=
Z v
0
sf(s)[2− F (s)]ds
= 2eA (v)− eM (v)
> 2eA (v)− eA (v)
= eA (v) .
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